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 Abstract 
 
This research report considers corporate governance within the public health 
sector, an area which has undergone significant changes in terms of 
structures, focus, and demand for service and funding.  As there has been 
little research conducted in this specific area, the report‟s major findings are 
based on a critical examination of the literature on governance in private and 
public sectors along with an analysis of the changes that have occurred in the 
New Zealand Health sector over time.  
 
A review of the governance literature provides evidence that good corporate 
governance, if it is initiated and maintained properly, has benefits that can be 
organisation wide.  The literature review provides evidence that effective 
governance can enhance the outcomes in the New Zealand health 
organisations that are part of a sector that has undergone four major 
restructures since 1989.  It appears that these restructures have largely been 
driven by post-election political ideology and in most cases the changes have 
had little success in improving corporate governance within this sector.   
 
This research report concludes that some small, but significant, changes are 
necessary if the effectiveness of District Health Boards is to be improved.  
This report suggests three key changes.  The first is to improve the structure 
by introducing new governance positions within District Health Boards.  This 
position is based at the executive level and offers impartial advice to the 
board on all corporate governance issues.  The second suggestion is that 
boards need to increase their diversity in order to improve performance, 
especially in geographical areas which have a large proportion of Pacific and 
Asian communities.  The final recommendation is that board members are 
offered individual remuneration linked directly to their attendance and 
performance.  These three changes, in turn, will help District Health Boards 
to become more effective in the way they operate.  
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Chapter One – Introduction       
1.1   Background  
The public health care sector in New Zealand is extremely fragmented and 
complex. The New Zealand public health care sector is subject to a minefield 
of political and commercial intrusions for reasons which are not directly 
related to the health care sector (Mathias, 2009). This means that corporate 
governance in the public health care sector differs considerably from other 
public entities and private sector organisations. Continuing pressure on 
boards to ensure that they are financially stable, spending within their limited 
budget and funding programmes which have been directed by the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) has forced District Health Boards (DHBs) to become more 
commercially sensitive, which in turn creates tension in terms of their mission 
set by both MoH and the boards themselves.  
 
Decision making in this sort of environment offers much ambiguity, and is 
contingent on the knowledge and characteristics of individual decision 
makers, who make up the boards (Mathias, 2009).  Lack of familiarity with the 
concept of what corporate governance is, also contributes to this ambiguous 
environment. Furthermore, the New Zealand public health care sector has 
been reviewed and restructured four times since 1989 (Mathias, 2009; Ingley 
& van der Walt, 2005; Bawden, 2008; Barnett & Clayden, 2007; Chalmers, 
2008). These major structural changes have occurred when the government 
of the day has changed. When the government changes so do the political 
ideologies that structure the health policies and principles (Mathias, 2009).  
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Before these complex issues are explored it is necessary to gain an 
understanding of what corporate governance is, what corporate governance 
in the New Zealand public health care system is, and to examine the 
historical framework of the health care sector which has occurred in New 
Zealand.  It is also advantageous to investigate the link between public health 
history and the precedents that exist in corporate governance decision 
making in today‟s public health care environment.  
 
1.2 Justification for Study 
Corporate Governance, or more importantly, the intent in how to make 
corporate governance more effective, has become increasingly important 
with governments, public and private organisations and individuals within the 
past 20 years (Bawden, 2008). In New Zealand, the Securities Commission 
has been the major catalyst for initiating changes in the way organisations 
regulate their governance practices (Mathias, 2009). According to Leblanc 
(2003), corporate governance is the topic of the decade for management and 
business journals but has been rather slow to be explored as a topic of 
academic enquiry. I agree with Leblanc, based on my examination of the 
literature where there is a steady stream of literature around establishing 
precedent for change, but until recently, there has been little academic 
research focussed on corporate governance. Corporate governance has 
been explored at length within the private sector; however it has not received 
the same level of attention or analysis in the public sector (Bawden, 2008; 
Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005).  
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This research considers corporate governance within the public health care 
sector, an area which has undergone significant changes in terms of 
structure, focus, and demand for service and funding. There has been little 
research conducted in this specific area and I am hoping to address some 
part of these recent changes. Political involvement and political interference 
is also an extremely important aspect of corporate governance in the New 
Zealand public health care sector and very worthy of inquiry, but due to the 
limitations of this study I have decided to exclude this aspect. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The primary purpose of this current research report is to explore, in detail, the 
corporate governance arrangements in DHBs, and highlight any changes 
which I think are necessary to enhance the performance of DHBs. This 
research report aims to explain the workings of corporate governance within 
the public health care sector in order to see whether there is room for 
improvement. To determine this I will be reviewing the current board structure 
and seeing whether I can address any inefficiencies and offer ways to 
correcting these.  
More specifically, the two main questions addressed in this research report 
are:  
1. What changes have occurred in health governance in New Zealand? 
2. What associated governance factors/issues make DHB boards more 
effective?  
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1.4 Structure of the Report 
This report centres on two major themes. Chapter two focuses on these: 
firstly the structure of corporate governance within the public health care 
sector in New Zealand, which is discussed, and secondly, questions about 
how to make the board of directors more effective.  
 
The literature review which follows in the next chapter will be structured with 
these two major themes.  
 
In chapter three, I define corporate governance and illustrate how this relates 
to the public health care sector. I discuss the DHB governance model in-
depth, the history of the health sector in New Zealand, the effects of the 
various public health care sector reforms which have taken place and the 
consequences that these reforms have had on the structure and makeup of 
corporate governance in the public health care sector.  I also discuss the 
concept of board remuneration and the idea of performance related 
remuneration, board structure and board diversity.  
 
Chapter four presents the report‟s main conclusions and Chapter five 
encompasses recommendations to the health system and suggestions for 
further research.  
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
2.  Structure and Corporate Governance of District Health Boards 
This study is aiming to review and comment on the structure of corporate 
governance in District Health Boards (DHBs) in New Zealand and explore 
whether there is room for improvement in the way corporate governance in 
DHBs are currently structured.   
 
This study is important for a number of reasons. Having good corporate 
governance is a challenge for any industry, but especially when it comes to 
organisations operating in the public health sector, which face many 
challenges through funding, political interference, and public expectations. 
 
The intentions of this chapter are to review and highlight the available 
literature around corporate governance in the New Zealand public health care 
sector. The first section of this chapter introduces corporate governance as a 
concept. The second section focuses on specifically highlighting corporate 
governance in the New Zealand health care sector and finally, section three 
is a review of the consequences of the various health sector reforms which 
have occurred in New Zealand over the past 20 years.  
 
A literature search was conducted using various electronic academic 
databases with the keywords of: Corporate Governance, Hospital, Boards, 
Health, and District Health Boards. I identified both theoretical and empirical 
articles which specifically addressed the concept of corporate governance, 
and the New Zealand public health care system.  
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There is a large amount of literature around private sector corporate 
governance, as well as some literature around corporate governance in a 
New Zealand health care setting. However the latter is somewhat limited.  
 
2.1   Introduction to Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has become a major issue for organisations to deal 
with and has attracted a great deal of public interest in the past few years 
(Kooskora, 2006). Corporate governance is a set of procedures which boards 
use to direct the organisation, and it also includes ways which the 
organisation should use to build relationships with their stakeholders 
Crauford (2007). Corporate governance is important for organisations as it 
outlines accountability of board members and helps to lessen conflict of 
interests (Bawden, 2008).  
 
Farrar, (2008) examined the history of corporate governance right back to the 
late 19th century. With the growth of qualified managers, the creation of 
potentially conflicting interests occurred between the owners or shareholders 
of a business and the managers who actually ran the business. Corporate 
governance, as a concept, had its beginning in the corporate sector (Bawden, 
2008). Corporate governance is described by many commentators as a 
process which aids the direction, monitoring and authority of all activities 
within an organisation (Mathias, 2009; Leblanc & Gilles, 2005). It is also 
accepted that governance concerns are intrinsically complex. Both 
organisations and directors need to be aware of this and must start to 
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recognise this issue and start proposing solutions (Norgate, 2005; Mathias, 
2009) In essence, corporate governance is what makes sure the right 
questions gets asked by the board to the management and to make sure that 
the right answers are given to reflect the long term strategic goal of the 
organisation. It is commonly understood that the position of the board is one 
of conscientious supervision, and that directors should not be occupied with 
the day to day running of the organisation (Goodman, & McPee, 2008). The 
obvious major challenge for directors is to get the right level of balance in 
decision making (Mathias, 2009). Garratt, (2005, p.30) states that „the real 
role of a corporate director is balancing prudence with progress‟. Farrar, 
(2008, p. 23) described this as the agency dilemma, „management, in the 
absence of a countervailing power, have a tendency to pursue their own self-
interest at the expense of the corporation‟. Organisations moved swiftly to 
respond to such dilemmas and developed systems to help owners oversee 
management (Bawden, 2008). This also helped owners to observe that 
managers were operating within the law and maximising the wealth for 
themselves (Bawden, 2008; Farrar, 2008)  
 
Governance, or more explicitly how to make corporate governance more 
effective, has been an issue of major concern for many board directors 
(Mathias, 2009). Such concerns have led to interest in corporate governance. 
For academics, focus of corporate governance has certainly been worthy of 
investigation (Mathias, 2009; Leblanc, 2003). While there is a plethora of 
case analysis published along with plenty of options from a legal point of 
view, there is very little in the way of academic research into corporate 
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governance in the public setting (Mathias, 2009; Clatworhty, Mellet & Peel, 
2000). An independent survey into the literature shows that there are few 
writers outside of popular journals who explore the subject in any great depth 
(Cadbury, 1992; Charkham, 1994; Farrar, 2005; Garrat, 2003b; Monks & 
Minow, 2001). There is both a lack of research in the public sector, and a lack 
of research on organisations operating in New Zealand. Leblanc (2003) also 
reported that most research available was quantitative and was frequently 
associated with financial performance of an organisation. There are no 
studies which focus on corporate performance. So this has resulted in gaps 
in the literature.  
 
There are many various definitions of what corporate governance is.  
Crauford (2007) explains that „corporate governance is the set of processes, 
customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporate is 
directed, administered or controlled‟ p.88.  
 
Alexander, Lee, and Bazzoli (2003, p.228) state that „corporate governance 
assumes board responsibility for an organisation‟s survival and well being. 
The act of governance is distinguished from that of management‟.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
defines corporate governance firstly as the „structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives, and monitoring performance‟ and secondly, as, „the relationship 
between the board and the company‟s shareholders and its other 
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stakeholders‟. However, corporate governance has considerably more 
connotations, for example, its relationship with the economic and social well 
being of both organisations and people (Clark, 2008).  
 
It is considered that corporate governance plays a significant part in the 
economic health of organisations and that when corporate governance is 
poorly defined this can have a detrimental effect on the organisation 
(Kooskora, 2006; Rayman-Bacchus, 2003). Most definitions of corporate 
governance embrace these major themes: accountability, probity, 
transparency, direction, control and the achievement of the organisations 
objectives (Mathias, 2009).  
 
Corporate governance and its association with the performance of an 
organisation has been insufficiently studied, especially in the public sector 
(Mathias, 2009; Garrat, 2003a; Leblanc, 2003; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; 
Clatworthy et al, 2000). A great deal of corporate governance literature 
concentrates on the traditional commercial methodology which is based on 
the historical origins of the corporation (Mathias, 2009; Grayburn & Garlick, 
1998), and also limited liability companies in the 18th and 19 centuries 
(Charkham, 2005; Cumming, 2000; Smith, 1776; and Lockhart, 2006). 
The latest research has claimed that political and regulatory environments 
have had a considerable impact on corporate governance (Firth, Fung and 
Rui, 2006). By the 1950‟s New Zealand had already started developing some 
early form of corporate governance under the Companies Act 1955, and this 
has since been further defined with the passing of the Companies Act 1993 
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and the Crown Entities Act 2004 (Mathias, 2009). However „good‟ 
governance is not defined in either of these two Acts (Ingley & Van der Walt, 
2005, p.643).  
 
Lack of attention to corporate governance has highlighted the need for 
debate to occur on trying to improve corporate governance (Anderson, 
Melanson and Maly, 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005).  
 
2.1.1 Agency Theory  
A large proportion of the available literature focuses on agency theory and 
how organisations need to separate ownership from the management of an 
organisation (Berle & Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Anderson et al, 2007; 
Lockhart, 2006). There are other theories which you can relate to corporate 
governance, like stakeholder theory. However for this research I will only be 
looking at agency theory. Agency theory is by far the foremost concept in the 
literature when it comes to corporate governance (Anderson et al, 2007; 
Mathias, 2009; Lockhart, 2006). Corporate governance has been dominated 
by agency theory when reviewing the structure and composition of the 
boards, especially in publicly run organisations (Brundin & Nordqvist, 2008; 
Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Reoberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Van der 
Walt, & Ingley, 2003).  
 
Agency theory started to take shape in the 1932 seminal work of Berle and 
Means on the separation of owners and managers. Tosi (2008, p.163) argues 
that „From both a theoretical and a practical perspective, the base of 
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corporate governance issue is the separation of ownership from the control of 
the firm‟. The agency relationship is defined by Tosi (2008, p.160), as „a 
contract user which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage with 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent‟.  
 
In terms of organisations today, the literature around agency theory centres 
on the internal management structure of the firm, and the characteristic 
observation is that shareholders and the board of directors are the principles 
while the managers and more explicitly the CEO are the agents (Tosi, 2008; 
Van der Walt et al, 2003). Kooskora (2006, p.27) states that „Corporate 
governance is most often viewed as both the structure and the relationships 
that determine corporate direction and performance. With agency theory the 
control is in the hands of the managers who act as “agents” for the owners. 
Since this control is in the hands of the managers then these agents do not 
always act in the interest of the owners (Anderson et al, 2007; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Agarwal, 2010). To counter this, owners need to have checks and 
balances in place which help to monitor the managers, as well as offering 
incentives to managers. This is done are done to increase the amount of 
information which is passed on to the owners.  
 
The problem of agency occurs due to the basic tenets of economic theory in 
which all individuals are motivated by self-interest (Anderson et al, 2007).  
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Branston, Cowling and Sugden, (2006, p.199) state that „most literature on 
corporate governance considers the exact nature of the controlling group by 
centring the debate on the relationship between shareholders and 
managers‟. Agency theory is the base which corporate governance 
developed from. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There have been many instances whereby corporate governance structures 
in the private sector have been duplicated into the public sector with drastic 
results (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005). Howard et al (2005, p.56) say that 
„the context in which they [public sector organisations] make decisions is 
complicated by factors not found in the private sector, such as the role of 
government ministers, the necessity of taking into account government policy 
and/or community service obligations‟.  
 
2.1.2  Board Effectiveness  
Much of the debate around corporate governance has been directed towards 
the size, structure and makeup of the board (Lehn, Patro and Lhao, 2004). 
Boards of directors serve two primary functions: firstly they give directions to 
the managers about the organisation‟s strategy (Lehn et al, 2004) and 
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secondly, they monitor the implementation of these strategies by the 
managers (Monks & Minow, 2001).  
 
Strach, Hall, and Pirozek, (2004, p.3) state that „good governance can attain 
better performance and better management in businesses as well as in public 
institutions‟. Another important statement is made by Wolfensohn, (1999, 
p.21), „governance of corporations is now as important in the world economy 
as the government of countries‟. New Zealand has experienced its share of 
political and economic transformation. We have experimented with 
competition in the sector to try to make the sector more efficient (Docteur and 
Oxley, 2003). Now there is more of a cooperation approach (Quin, 2009).  
 
2.1.2.1Board Size 
Lehn et al (2004, p.1) points out that „many scholars, investors, and 
regulators argue that corporate boards should be small and comprised 
largely of independent directors‟. There is not a vast amount of literature 
around what is the optimal size of a board. Much of the literature that 
theorises or addresses optimal size states that small boards function more 
effectively (Lehn et al, 2004; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2004; Yang, Linck 
and Netter, 2004). For example, the position of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) on 
board size is that boards with 10 or more members become more difficult to 
operate, and it is harder for members to express their opinions more freely. 
Furthermore, Jenson (1993) maintain that having small boards can help 
boost the performance of the board and that when boards exceed eight 
members it is doubtful that they function effectively. Lehn et al, 2004, point 
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out that large boards are weak and that the „major advantage of large boards 
is the collective information that the board possesses about factors that affect 
the value of firms...however the major disadvantages of large boards are the 
coordination costs and „free rider‟ problems‟. This free rider difficulty is 
associated with large boards in which the average level of influence that a 
board member has, or is perceived to have, fluctuates depending on the size 
of the board (Lehn et al, 2004). The problem with this argument is that board 
members have reduced influence then they may also have decreased 
enticement in monitoring management (Lehn et al, 2004; Agarwal, 2010).  
 
 
2.1.2.2 Board Composition 
Another factor that can impact board effectiveness is board composition. 
However this factor is also inadequately researched and there is also an 
inadequate amount of literature which summarises the determinants of what 
a good board composition would be (Lehn et al, 2004; Agarwal, 2010; 
Blackham, 2007).  
 
Why board composition is so important is that many board members might 
not have the required skills to perform the task of governing and organisation 
(Clark, 2008). This can have a detrimental effect on the board. Dube and 
Slattery, (2007) discuss creating an important position within an organisation. 
This position is called the “Chief Governance Officer”. This position is an 
executive manager who offers impartial advice to the board on all 
governance related matters (Dube et al, 2007). This position helps the board 
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in developing good corporate governance policies and helps to educate the 
board on governance issues (Dube et al, 2007). This position would help 
immensely when it came to board members who needed extra education on 
governance issues.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), propose a ratio of two independent directors for 
every internal director. Jensen (1993) disputes this idea and states that the 
only internal director sitting on the board should be the CEO. This is due to 
the fact that no inside directors can critically evaluate the CEO.  
 
The quality of decisions made by a board should imitate the capabilities of its 
members (Lockhart, 2006). Members need to have the right amount of 
experience, work ethic and relevant skills to enable them to make the right 
decisions in an effective way. Most boards normally meet for a few hours a 
month, and in this time they must absorb and evaluate complex information. 
It is extremely important to select directors who have outstanding capabilities 
and are capable of handling this knowledge in an appropriate way (Lockhart, 
2006; Blackham, 2007).  
In the first part of 2003 a review was conducted by Higgs. This review looked 
at the roles of independent directors and focused on their role, contribution, 
remuneration, selection and duration (Higgs, 2003; Garratt, 2003).  
 
Board composition is also likely to change if a board is either elected or 
appointed by the government (Van der Walt, Ingley, & Diack, 2002). With 
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corporate governance, the concept of diversity on the board is associated 
with board composition (Van der Walt, & Ingley, 2003).   
 
2.1.2.3 Board Structure 
The focal point when one describes corporate governance should be to 
review an organisation‟s structure, processes, managerial and board control 
and most importantly in my mind, strategic direction.  
 
Crauford (2007, p.88) argues most organisations have „focused on the 
structure of boards including their size, composition, independence of 
directors...but what is the role of the board and is there a relationship 
between board structure and corporate performance?‟ 
 
Empirical findings on the degree to which the board has influence on 
strategic participation continue to be largely miscellaneous (Brauer, and 
Schmidt, 2008). What is clear about this is that the board is not that involved 
in the formulation of strategies (Crauford, 2007). The board needs to be 
involved in more than just “rubber stamping” management‟s strategic 
suggestions and needs to be developing the strategic future of their 
organisation (Brauer et al, 2008; Blackham, 2007).  
Strategy is an important characteristic which boards need to cope with 
(Sioncke & Parmentier, 2007; Nwabueze, & Mileski, 2008; Maharaj, 2009). 
An unambiguous and distinct strategy formulation and implementation are 
just as important as any other corporate governance issue (Sioncke et al, 
2007; Nwabueze et al, 2008). There are, however, numerous causes which 
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make it difficult for organisations to reach these performance expectations 
(Verweire and van den Berghe, 2004; Nwabueze et al, 2008). 
 
One theory which Emslie, Oliver, and Bruce, (2006) observe is what is known 
as “Policy Governance”. Policy governance is an integrated concept which 
describes how to govern a board (Emslie, et al, 2006). There is increasing 
recognition that good corporate governance and the role the board takes in 
overseeing an organisation do make a difference in the performance of that 
organisation (Emslie, et al, 2006; Agarwal, 2010). However, Barnett, and 
Clayden, (2007, p.vii) argue that: „International research suggests that the 
structures of governance actually play a limited part in the effective 
functioning of boards, but are important for locating boards in their context, by 
defining expectations, accountabilities and essential relationships‟.  
 
Boards need to make sure that their structure is to serve their needs and the 
needs of the organisation and community (Van der Walt, Ingley, Shergill, and 
Townsend, 2006). Barnett et al, (2007, p.xvii) illustrate that „skill mix, 
experience and time have been shown in the literature as important for 
effective functioning‟. Considerable investment is necessary to improve and 
maintain the performance of boards (Barnett et al, 2007; Agarwal, 2010).   
 
Rao, and Hossai, (2002) believe that board composition and the performance 
of an organisation in cooperation with each other respond in a positive 
manner. Boards are wholly accountable to the shareholders for performance 
of their organisation. The only issue with this is that members are normally 
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only a part time mechanism and have rather complex tasks and it is 
impossible for them to have knowledge of all the happenings within the 
organisation.  
 
2.1.2.4 Board Remuneration 
The subject of board remuneration has attracted much academic and media 
attention within the past few years (Lee, 2009; Blackham, 2007). There are 
many authors who consider linking board remuneration to performance (Lee, 
2009; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Denis, 2001; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse, and Kouzmin, 2001). Pervost,  
 
Board remuneration is an issue which has attracted much academic, political 
and media debate throughout the world, with the exception of New Zealand 
(Cahan, Chua, & Nyamori, 2005; Agarwal, 2010).  Academic research on 
board remuneration is extensive but mainly based within the private sector 
(Cahan et al, 2005; Murphy, 1998; Swagerman, and Terpstra, 2009). 
Brickley, van Horn, and Wedig, (2003) acknowledge that most research is 
based on private organisations and that there is little research on public 
sector entities; this is also backed up by Cahan et al, (2005). Nevertheless, it 
is still a very critical issue since boards in the public sector play a more 
important role than those based in the private sector due to the extensive use 
of tax payers‟ money. There is a considerable amount of literature that 
supports the belief that governments should arrange public sector boards to 
be more like boards within the private sector. 
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Board members need to attend more than just meetings; board membership 
involves a significant dedication of time, a dedication which increasingly 
requires better remuneration (Goodman et al, 2008).  
 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker, (1999) believe that board remuneration can 
help to address board effectiveness as remuneration decisions are an 
important way of managing the board more effectively.   
Kubo, (2005) found that the effect of performance related board remuneration 
did have an effect on the performance of an organisation, and that 
organisations which have higher remuneration rates for their board members 
are more likely to achieve better results.  
 
Goodman et al, 2008, illustrated that the majority of payments are made 
through “meeting fees”. However, more and more organisations are paying 
their directors through annual retainers. Agarwal, (2010, p.28) argues that 
„compensation should be predominantly cash based on short term 
performance‟. Most corporate governance authors recommend that board 
remuneration consists of both cash and equity based payments (Goodman et 
al, 2008; Cook, 2009).  
 
  
There is a vast amount of literature around corporate governance. Most of 
this literature is based on International, and the private sector model. 
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There is some public sector literature but a lot of this is not relevant to this 
study. This literature is limited in what it addresses and cannot be easily 
adopted into the New Zealand public sector as it is mostly based in the 
United States of America.  
 
Again there are a number of different definitions of corporate governance, but 
they all have the same defining characteristics.  
 
There are a number of studies which show that having good corporate 
governance is good for the organisation. Most of this literature also 
comments about board size, structure and remuneration which I will 
elaborate on in the discussion section.  
 
2.2  Corporate Governance in the New Zealand Health Sector 
The government is the foremost supplier of funding and provision of the 
health care service in New Zealand (Quin, 2009; Bawden, 2008; Ashton, 
Cumming, and McLean, 2004). Governance in the health sector has changed 
with every past election restructure. In New Zealand, corporate governance 
issues have been fundamental to the restructurings of the health sector within 
the last 20 years (Barnett et al, 2007). 
   
Organisations in the public sector have more functions to perform than just 
maximising shareholder value and are unable to trace their performance via 
the share market or through any other purely financial means. Corporate 
governance is much more complex for public sector organisations. This is 
21 
 
mainly due to increasing political interference at the board level as well as the 
need to support the requirements of the local community.  
 
Cornforth, (2003) recognises this concern and states: „oversimplifying the 
problems, underestimating the conflicting demands and pressures that board 
members face, and presenting solutions that are difficult to implement in 
practice‟.  
 
In terms of corporate governance, DHBs need to focus on defining their 
function, identifying the organisation‟s interest and identifying how they will 
achieve all of these objectives (Bawden, 2008). However, although these 
objectives are not new, it is important to note that the achievement of these 
objectives is often more difficult due to DHBs having different source of 
revenue and a vast number of obligations to perform under various legislation 
and regulations (Ashton et al, 2004).  
 
The reforms which have taken place in New Zealand aimed to provide better 
fiscal and management autonomy to DHBs, in order for them to improve the 
quality of the health care that they were providing, as well as making it more 
cost effective (Mordelet, 2008).  
 
DHBs have a legal status under corporate law. However this does not by 
itself mean that they operate as a corporate organisation, with corporate 
principles and a corporate mindset (Ashton et al, 2004).    
 
22 
 
Efficient governance of DHBs requires responsible use of funding, 
professional management of the organisation and good competent corporate 
governance (Strach et al, 2004).  
 
The health care system in New Zealand is similar to that of many other 
western countries (Strach et al, 2004) and has been subjected to numerous 
forms of restructure (Barnett et al, 2007). When the majority of the health 
care system is funded via the government then extensive changes need to be 
made to ensure that the tax payer is receiving the best health care system for 
the money invested. Restructuring was a way that government could make 
change. These changes have resulted in alterations in the way public 
hospitals have been funded, changes to the services they offer and how they 
offer the services (Finlayson and Gower, 2002).  
 
At present, public hospitals are separated into geographical areas called 
District Health Board catchment areas. The way DHBs are funded is through 
the PBFF, which basically means that they are funded on the basis of the 
„particular requirements of the people living in the geographical location‟ 
(Strach et al., (2004, p.10). The main performance functions of DHBs are to 
„attain a fair and functional health care system that is effective in contributing 
to the health of New Zealanders‟ (Ministry of Health, 2004). The DHB 
members are responsible for governing the health services within their 
district. A board needs to preserve financial stability and needs to „improve, 
promote and protect the health of those within its district and to promote the 
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independence of people with disabilities within its district‟ (Ministry of Health, 
2004).  
 
The shift to corporate governance was rather rapid in New Zealand (Perkins, 
Barnett and Powell, 2000). It was coupled with various other public sector 
reforms which were taking place with the National government in the early 
1990s. These changes were anticipated to place the public health sector on a 
strong and logical commercial footing (Perkins, et al., 2000).  
The Labour-led government in 1999 announced the current shake up of the 
health service. The first move was to change the focus on the corporate 
rationalist model of governance, reinstating locally elected boards and 
eliminating the provider/purchaser divide (Devlin, et al, 2001). The strategies 
which the Labour-led government adopted was built upon strategies which 
already existed (Devlin, et al, 2001). This was good for the newly formed 
government as it meant that they did not attract a large amount of criticism. 
Even though the health strategies did not change a great deal, the actual 
structure of the health system did (Devlin, et al, 2001; Ashton et al, 2004). It 
was so radical that new legislation had to be drafted and passed by 
parliament. The new structure was seen by most as a positive change. Some 
still argued that the extensive reform was excessive (Devlin, et al, 2001).  
The current health system reinstates a form of the local governance which 
was similar to the AHBs in the 1980s to early 1990s (Devlin, et al).  
The DHB structure which the Labour government wanted with having more of 
a local autonomy in the decision making of the boards has now taken shape. 
However, just because the governance has been given to DHBs does not 
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mean that they do not have to have accountability to the Minister of Health. 
Strict accountability has been developed and the Minister of Health has the 
means to review and control the actions of DHBs (Devlin, et al, 2001). One 
notable difference with DHBs and AHBs is the number of DHBs. There are 21 
DHBs compared to 14 AHBs. This was beneficial as DHBs can concentrate 
on their populations as there are many areas which have small populations 
with challenging needs; for example Northland and the Gisborne areas. 
There have been many commentators who argue that 21 DHBs is not 
sustainable and a reduction or amalgamation may need to occur (Devlin, et 
al, 2001). 
 
 
Like the private sector, the health sector needs to have good corporate 
governance principles in place, and needs to function like a well oiled wheel. 
This section of the literature has explained why changes have occurred in the 
past and reiterates ideas to focus on during my discussion.   
 
The public health sector is such an important part of our daily lives. Health 
takes a large proportion of our tax dollars and we need to make sure that our 
current health structure functions efficiently. There is not a lot of research 
around corporate governance in the public health sector which means that 
research does need to be conducted.  
 
From the literature we can gage that good governance does make 
organisation improve their performance. The health system in New Zealand 
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has had some radical changes, and each of these changes has resulted in a 
different governance structure. None of these were perfect, or even near 
perfect.  
 
2.3  History of the Reforms in the Public Health Sector 
When the Labour movement took off around the world in the 1930s it defined 
the way governments looked at addressing inequalities in social services 
which had occurred as a result of capitalism (Chalmers, 2008; Castles & 
Shirley, 1996). After both World Wars people were becoming more aware 
and concerned with the economic and social issues when it came to health, 
old age and unemployment (Chalmers, 2008; Gustafson, 1997). When the 
first Labour government under Michael Joseph Savage was elected in 1935 
they introduced wide changes in social security and the start of a publicly 
funded health care system emerged (Gustafson, 1997; Mathias, 2009; Ingley 
& van der Walt, 2005; Bawden, 2008; Barnett & Clayden, 2007; Chalmers, 
2008). 
Since 1983 the public health care sector in New Zealand has undergone four 
major structural changes (Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000). Each structural 
change has seen new organisations set up to fund and deliver health 
services to the New Zealand public (Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000).  
Along with the four changes to the public health care sector came four major 
legislative changes, these being:  
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1. Area Health Boards Act 1983; 
2. Health and Disability Act 1993; 
3. Health and Disability Services Amendment Act 1998; and 
4. New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 
 
The Area Health Boards Act 1983 created the gradual establishment of the 
14 Area Health Boards (AHBs) which were based on the population based 
funding formula (PBFF) (Quin, 2009; Barnett, Perkins, & Powell, 2001). 
The Health and Disability Act 1993 created four Regional Health Authorities 
(RHAs). This meant that the purchasing and supply of health care service 
was detached from one another and the AHBs were structured into 23 for-
profit „Crown Health Enterprises‟ (CHEs) and were now subject to company 
law like any other company operating in New Zealand (Quin, 2009; Perkins, 
et al, 2000; Barnett et al, 2001). 
 
The Health and Disability Services Amendment Act 1998 was a result of the 
coalition agreement between National and the New Zealand First parties. The 
agreement stated that a reform of the health system should occur. This 
resulted in another restructure and the RHAs became one national 
purchasing agency called the Health Funding Authority (HFA). The 23 CHEs 
were then reconfigured as 24 non profit crown owned companies and 
renamed „Hospital and Health Services‟ (HHSs). (Quin, 2009; Barnett et al, 
2001). 
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At the end of 1999 the newly elected Labour-Alliance coalition government 
went about with the fourth and final restructure with the introduction of the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (NZPHD) (Quin, 2009; 
Ashton et al, 2004). The NZPHD established 21 DHBs and had provisions to 
develop Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) whose task it was to manage 
the primary health care strategy (King, 2001).  
 
All of these changes were intended to enhance health outcomes, increase 
accountability within the public health sector as at the time it was seen to 
have been lacking and to reduce the increasing pressure on health 
expenditure (Quin, 2009).  
 
New Zealand was not alone  and has faced similar problems with other 
countries when it came to the need or the desire to restructure health care 
(Quin, 2009; Barnett et al, 2007). The population was ageing; technology was 
becoming more advanced and more expensive for hospitals to purchase 
(Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004) and the public‟s expectations of what they 
expected for their tax dollars increased.  
 
Inconsistencies in health service is not a new phenomenon, and is not 
something that will be corrected overnight. Concerns  about the quality and 
unequal access to health care caused great public and political debate for 
many years prior to 1983 (Gauld, 2001; Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000). 
Even so it was not until the newly elected 1975 National Government that a 
realistic attempt to reform the health sector actually started to take form 
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(Quin, 2009). The National government established a Special Advisory 
Committee of Health Service Organisation (SACHSO) to review which 
restructuring approach would be best (Quin, 2009). The committee 
recommended that locally elected AHBs be established (Quin, 2009). The 
National government piloted the AHB model in both Northland and Wellington 
before rolling it out nationwide (Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004) 
By a snap election in 1984 the fourth Labour government came into power 
(Gauld, 2001). Considerable reform across the whole state sector occurred 
(Gauld, 2001; Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004). Many advisors at the time 
recommended that the government take more of a „commercial‟ stance when 
it came to the health sector. However the government continued on with the 
AHB model.  
The significant changes were that 14 locally elected and appointed AHBs 
were formed between 1983 and 1989 (Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000). 
PBFF was being developed so that each region was funded for their 
population needs more than their actual population (Perkins, et al, 2000). The 
Department of Health (DoH) was becoming more decentralised with planning, 
funding and responsibilities falling to AHBs (Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004). 
With this first reform a more preventative approach was seen to be occurring 
as in the past it was more curative (Quin, 2009). 
 
The AHBs themselves varied in size, from serving a population of 35,000 to 
serving a population of 900,000 people. Until 1991 board members were 
elected through local body elections and the Minister of Health was able to 
appoint up to four further members to make up any deficiencies, for example 
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in board diversity, business skills, or cultural skills (Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 
2000). In 1991 the National government announced that they would be 
appointing „Commissioners‟ to run AHBs while the next intended reforms 
were being sorted out (Quin, 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000).  
 
In February 1992 the government announced that AHBs could introduce user 
charges. The motivation for this was to try to discourage people using 
hospitals for treatment of primary health care, as this had major effects on 
health expenditure (Ashton, 1992; Quin. 2009; Perkins, et al, 2000). However 
this policy was abandoned a year later due to negative publicity and the 
financial cost which AHBs had to bear (Gauld, 2001).  
The newly elected National government progressed with the previous Labour 
government‟s widespread restructuring of the health sector but embarked on 
a more aggressive format. A ministerial task force was set up to review the 
perceived deficiencies within the health system (Gauld, 2005). The task force 
announced their recommendations on Budget night, July 1991. Their report 
repeated much of what was reported in the 1988 Gibbs report Unshackling 
the hospitals and also the report by Scott, 1986 Choices for health care: 
report of the Health Benefits Review. Both of these reports were published in 
the 1980s (Quin, 2009). The task force‟s report advocated that the health 
purchaser and health provider become independent of each other and that 
the health system should operate under a competitive, quasimarket approach 
for all services relating to the provision of health (Quin, 2009; Gauld, 2001; 
Perkins, et al, 2000). However there is evidence that the quasi market 
approach was not successful (Devlin et al, 2001). From this report the 
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government initiated four RHAs which were designed to purchase health 
services from a range of providers who operated in the competitive market 
(Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004). AHBs were changed to 23 CHEs which had 
the proviso to operate as commercial organisations and with boards who had 
been appointed by the Minister of Health (Gauld, 1999).   
 
The government announced that the new system would not take effect for 
two years, and the scheduled start date was 1 July 1993, which allowed for 
more consultation to occur (Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004). However work 
began immediately with AHB members being substituted for commissioners 
who were government appointed. The execution of this process was 
managed not by the DoH but by the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPMC).  
An additional transformation was the relocation of funding to the new RHAs, 
and the DoH became the MoH (Quin, 2009).  
 
The Public Health Commission (PHC) was created to be an independent 
voice from the MoH (Quin, 2009). The PHC‟s main function was to advise the 
Minister of Health on a range of health, public health, monitoring and 
purchasing of health services (Blank, 1994; Quin, 2009). The PHC entered 
into agreements with CHEs and other health providers for various services. 
However, the PHC was decommissioned in 1995 as the government realised 
that the PHC offered additional structure to a public health service which was 
already burdened with enough red tape. Gauld, 2001 also states that the 
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PHC was decommissioned because much of their policy and advice to the 
Minister was at odds with other government policy at the time.  
 
With the establishment of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 the four 
RHAs were launched to purchase health care services for the 23 CHEs who 
were now classed as providers (Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004). One of the 
main responsibilities that the RHAs had was to monitor the health needs of 
the populations in which they served and purchase the appropriate services 
for the population (Bloom, 2000). The four RHAs were: Northern, Midland, 
Central and Southern (Quin, 2009). Each RHA was accountable for between 
750,000 and 1,000,000 people and had the added responsibility to purchase 
not only primary, secondary and continuing care, but also accident related 
health services both from the government and private providers (Quin, 2009; 
Coster & McAovy, 1996; Ashton et al, 2004). 
 
Like AHBs, RHAs were funded by the MoH via PBFF (Blank, 1994). The 
selection of directors on the whole was from people outside the health sector, 
primarily from business backgrounds (Barnett & Barnett, 2000). Now that the 
health system had a purchase/provider division, public hospitals no longer 
had the benefit of full access to public funding (Quin, 2009). The intention 
was to have RHAs introduce competitive competition around the whole health 
sector, including with private providers. However this never occurred and this 
policy was never implemented as the government once again changed 
(Ashton, Mays & Devlin, 2005).  
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CHEs were intended to make public health care more efficient. They were 
shaped to be autonomous, publicly owned organisations which typically 
included a main hospital, or various hospitals supporting a region. CHEs 
were established to be similar to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and could 
operate as a registered limited liability company under the Companies Act 
1993 (Quin, 2009).  
 
With the first election under MMP a National-New Zealand First coalition 
agreement was written. Advice from Treasury, MoH and the Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit (CCMAU) resulted in the two parties negotiating that 
the current health system needed to be reviewed (Gauld, 2001). Ashton, 
1997 stated that this agreement was meant to signal a shift from a more 
competitive approach, to more of a cooperative approach to health care. The 
major changes identified in the agreement were that both the Ministers of 
Health and Crown Health Enterprises would be amalgamated into the 
position of Minister of Health (Quin, 2009). The four RHAs were 
amalgamated into one central health funding authority (HFA) which was 
tasked with having more of a focus on building better relationships with 
service providers (Gauld, 2001). CHEs were renamed and were now known 
as Hospital and Health Services and were made to be more businesslike and 
set out to make profits (Perkins, et al, 2000).  
 
Almost immediately after the 1996 election work started on integrating the 
four RHAs into one HFA (Quin, 2009). In 1997 the Transitional Health 
Authority (THA) was established to review the previous purchasing system 
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and to administer the merger of the four RHAs into the HFA (Gauld, 2001). 
The government passed the Health and Disability Services Amendment Act 
in 1998. This is when the HFA officially replaced the THA and assumed full 
accountability for the purchase and monitoring of the public health system. 
Even though the main functions of the HFA were the same as the RHAs the 
underlying principle for a single entity was to help reduce the cost within the 
health sector (Gauld, 2001; Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 2004).  
However this new reform developed quite a number of disagreements 
between officials and politicians. Gauld, 2001 says that only “elements of the 
coalition polices were promoted; other changes indicated attempts to 
repackage ideas introduced in 1993”. The coalition government eventually 
collapsed in August 1998 and the minority National government then focused 
on establishing the changes and working towards adding consistency to 
services and establishing a world class health system (Gauld, 2001).  
 
With the election in1999 saw another round change for the health sector. 
Labour‟s health policy released in 1999 emphasised their commitment to 
restructure the health system for the fourth time in nearly 20 years (Gauld, 
2001). The Labour-led government considered that the HFA structure was 
exceedingly competitive, have very little community participation and lacked 
accountability (Quin, 2009). So the Labour-led government set about to 
change this with the introduction of the New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Act 2000 (NZPHD). With the NZPHD the HFA was disestablished 
and the MoH became the principal organisation responsible for policy advice, 
funding and monitoring accountabilities for the health sector (Quin, 2009; 
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Gauld, 2001). Twenty one DHBs replaced the Hospital Health Services and 
took over the responsibility for providing health services to their local 
communities, and once again the boards of the DHBs were mainly elected 
via the community which they served (Ashton et al, 2004).  
 
DHBs are crown entities and through this are responsible to the Minister of 
Health and are also funded via PBFF by the MoH. DHBs are responsible for 
a wide range of planning, funding and ensuring that the health services are 
geographically designed for their population (MoH, 2006; Ashton et al, 2004). 
By law, DHBs are obliged to concentrate on reducing inequalities around 
their populations, prioritising health services within a predetermined budget 
set by the MoH, and providing a range of services including, disability 
support, mental health, primary health and of course secondary health 
services (Gauld, 2006). DHBs populations range from 30,000 to nearly 
500,000 (MoH, 2005).  
 
DHBs are governed by a board of 11 members. Seven of these are elected 
via the local body elections held every three years (Quin, 2009; Ashton et al, 
2004) and up to four board members are appointed by the Minister of Health. 
Each board is required to have at least two Maori members. These members 
can either be elected or appointed.  
The Crown Entities Act 2004 states that DHBs are to produce a Statement of 
Intent and an annual report which gets tabled in Parliament (Quin, 2009). 
This ensures a high level of accountability of individual DHBs. 
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Under this current system many Non government organisations (NGOs) have 
also been encouraged. Many health services are delivered by NGOs, 
especially in primary health care (Quin, 2009).  
 
 
This section has reviewed the key literature on the history of reforms in the 
public health sector in New Zealand. The main purpose of this section was to 
conclude that the New Zealand health sector has under gone four rigorous 
changes within the past 20 years, mainly due to changes in the ruling political 
parties of the day, and that these changes have meant that the health system 
still does not have an effective governance structure in place and that there is 
still room for improvement.  
 
In conclusion, there are a small number of research articles available which 
clearly explain that it is fundamental to District Health Boards to have a fully 
functioning corporate governance structure. In the next section I will outline 
what I see are fundamental changes which need to be addressed. 
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Chapter Three - Discussion  
Based on the literature that I have reviewed there are three main areas which 
I would like to address in helping to make DHBs become more effective. 
The three areas are: board remuneration, board structure and board 
diversity.  
 
The reason that I have chosen these three areas is because I see that if 
DHBs implement my proposed changes then they will be able to operate 
more effectively. I realise that my changes to board remuneration could be 
seem as controversial, especially when reviewed in the New Zealand public 
sector context. But I think that this is essential to get the “right” individual onto 
the board. Board size could be another controversial proposal. Many people 
see that having fewer people on a board gives members too much power and 
control. In this instance, the literature backs up my proposal, and that 
decreasing the current number of board members is essential. Board 
diversity is important, especially in a multi-cultural country like New Zealand. 
This is why I think that slightly enhancing diversity on DHBs is also 
encouraging, especially in the main areas where we see greater Pacific and 
Asian communities.  
 
3.1  Changes to Board Remuneration  
One area which is significantly covered in the literature is board 
remuneration. Based on the literature that I have reviewed I am going to 
propose a new system for board member remuneration in DHBs. This new 
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system is comprised of compulsory remuneration and a performance based 
remuneration design.  
 
There are many authors who consider linking board remuneration to 
performance as a positive mechanism for an organisation (Lee, 2009; Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Denis, 2001; Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & 
Kouzmin, 2001).  
 
In my proposed model, the board is still fully accountable to the Minister of 
Health. The Minister also has the final say on performance related 
remuneration (see Figure 2, p 38). 
 
In the first step of this process, the Ministry of Health compiles generic 
guidelines to all DHBs on performance-related remuneration. This information 
would explain the rationale behind the policy, and state guidelines which 
DHBs must follow. The second step of this process is that DHBs create a 
remuneration committee made up of at least four board members. This 
committee then compiles specific guidelines relating to the individual DHB.  
The third step is that the full board must then vote on the committee‟s 
recommendations. This must be passed by an outright majority.  
The final step in this process is that the performance-related remuneration 
then goes to the Minister of Health for their approval.  
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Figure 2 
 
One difficulty in this proposed plan is to define what parameters the board 
must achieve to improve the DHBs performance. This is why I would 
recommend that the performance related remuneration is targeted on the 
board completing 80% or above on their “Performance Related Targets”. 
These targets are set by the MoH. These targets are worked out individually 
for each DHBs population and would take into account the differing 
demographics, location and existing services offered by that DHB.  
The compulsory fees would include full board meetings, and any committee 
meetings that the member may be sitting on. The compulsory fees would 
increase if the member was the Chairperson, deputy Chairperson of the 
board or Chairperson of a committee.  
 
It is important to note that although the compulsory fees would be lower than 
what members are currently receiving, the performance-related remuneration 
would then be worked out in the process above and based on the outcomes 
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Full DHB 
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performance related 
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relating to individual DHB 
Agreement in Principle  
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of the DHBs performance-related targets. My rationale behind this is that with 
members receiving less compulsory payments it might make them think more 
objectively in their decision making, and want to become more efficient in the 
way they operate due to the extra performance pay that they are likely to 
receive if they reach their targets. Which comes back to a major principle of 
agency theory.  
 
Payment of this remuneration is based on the discretion of the Minister of 
Health and can be fully or partially paid if the Minister thinks that this is 
appropriate when the board does not comply with the target range.  
 
3.2  Changes to Board Size 
 Board size is another issue which has dominated the literature. However, 
although this issue is given a great deal of attention in the international 
literature, it has not been looked at in a New Zealand sense in any great 
detail. It is also interesting to note that the current number of board members 
sitting on DHBs is 11. The number of board members has not changed a 
great deal with the various public health structures that we have had since 
1983.  
 
Much of the debate around corporate governance has been directed towards 
the size, structure and makeup of the board (Lehn et al, 2004). A large 
amount of the literature talks about the optimal size of boards, and that 
smaller boards function more effectively than larger boards (Lehn et al,  
2004; Coles et al, 2004; Yang et al, 2004). 
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Currently the DHBs are allowed 11 members, with up to four members being 
appointed by the Minister of Health. My proposed solution is to limit this to 
nine members. Lipton et al, 1992 state that „when a board has more than 10 
members it becomes more difficult for them to express their ideas and 
opinions‟. There is some literature which states that seven or eight members 
should be the ideal size (Jenson, 1993; Lehn et al, 2004). In my proposed 
structure, nine members enables the board to have five elected members 
which allow adequate community representation, with the additional 
members being appointed with skills which might be lacking from the elected 
representatives on the board.  
In my proposed structure, I would have five members elected through local 
body elections as they are in the current system, and have up to four 
members appointed by the Minister of Health. I would also state that the 
appointed members should be appointed based on skills, experience and 
prior knowledge and not on political leanings or bias which can be the case in 
the current structure.  
 
In the new proposed structure I would recommend that all DHBs create a 
position which is known as the “Chief Governance Officer”. This position is 
based at the executive level on the management structure, but the officer sits 
in on board and committee meetings and offers impartial advice to the board 
on all corporate governance issues, and can also offer advice and education 
to board members who might not necessarily have the experience or skills to 
perform their jobs to a high standard.   
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The new proposed structure would look like this:  
 
 
3.3  Changes to Board Diversity 
Board diversity is another hotly debated topic in the literature. However there 
is very limited literature on what actually constitutes good board diversity 
(Lehn et al, 2004; Agarwal, 2010; Blackham, 2007).  
Jenson, 1993 expresses that the CEO should be the only internal director to 
sit on the board. I agree with this because I believe that internal directors are 
unable to critically evaluate the CEO and management of a DHB when they 
are staff members themselves. For example, this can create an issue when a 
staff member has been elected to the board as is the case in some current 
DHBs. This solution has the potential to create a conflict of interest. 
 
I think that having clinical or allied health experience on the board is an 
excellent idea and should be encouraged. However if an elected member is 
also a member of staff for that particular DHB, then they would have to resign 
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from their position to take a seat on the board as this could create an conflict 
of interest . This would not affect clinical or allied health professionals if they 
were not employed by the DHB. But they may also have a related interest in 
the private sector, and this could also create a conflict of interest which would 
have to be addressed.  
 
At the current time there has to be a minimum of two Maori members sitting 
on the board. These members can either be elected or appointed. Under my 
proposed structure I would keep this policy, but change the requirements to 
say that the board must have a minimum of “two cultural minority members”. 
This is due to the large Pacific and Asian communities now based in New 
Zealand. I think that these ethnic minorities also need to be represented at 
board level, especially in the highly populated areas. New Zealand is obliged 
under the Treaty of Waitangi to have bi-cultural representation, and I would 
not deviate from this. But because New Zealand is becoming more of a multi-
cultural country I think that it is also important that minority cultures are also 
represented at the board level. 
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Chapter Four - Conclusion 
4.1 Corporate Governance  
The strongest theme that emerges from this research report is that corporate 
governance, if it is initiated and maintained properly, has benefits that can be 
organisation wide. Good corporate governance provides for accountability 
between the board and its shareholders, and between the board and 
executive management.  
 
There is a vast amount of literature available around corporate governance, 
and especially corporate governance based in the private sector. Most of this 
literature is internationally based and cannot be easily adopted into New 
Zealand organisations.  
 
Governance research in the private sector contains a substantial amount of 
academic research investigations on three main areas: board size, board 
diversity and board member remuneration. These are important aspects for 
organisations to consider because boards need to get the right “fit” between 
the board and their particular company. Each company needs to carefully 
consider structure and size as these are critical factors for the performance of 
the organisation. This report concludes that great care should be taken when 
organisations review their structure and I believe such a review is necessary.  
 
4.2 Corporate Governance in the Public Health Sector 
Although the amount of literature around corporate governance in the New 
Zealand health sector is not substantial, there are a number of key 
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documents which provide key evidence that can be applied to governance in 
the New Zealand health setting. But there is little in peer viewed academic 
research that offers good, practical advice for today‟s health structure.  
 
Like the private sector, both DHBs and the public sector at large need to 
have good corporate governance principles in place if they are to succeed 
and be efficient. Efficiency in this environment is vital because DHBs are 
responsible for around nine billion tax payers dollars each year and are not 
only accountable to the Minister of Health, but also to their local communities, 
who elect the majority of the members sitting on the board.  
 
Although this report recognises that many changes have occurred within the 
health sector, DHBs to become more effective, they need to review their size, 
structure, and diversity of their board. Such changes will improve corporate 
governance and, in turn, improve organisation performance, both in the 
public and private sector, and the health sector is not immune to these 
changes.  
 
4.3 Reforms in the Public Health Sector  
Since the Labour movement in the 1930s started to take off, the government 
began to look at addressing inequalities in health. At the same time, the 
general public were becoming more concerned about health care, and other 
social issues, due to the fall of capitalism, when the lower and middle 
socioeconomic classes in New Zealand started to develop.  
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The first public health services in New Zealand stared to emerge in 1935 with 
Michael Joseph Savage‟s Labour government. There was not a great deal of 
change till 1983, and since this time we have experienced four major 
structural changes to our health system. Each structural change has resulted 
in new organisations being established and/or disestablished.  
 
This current report provides evidence that the current structure, in general 
terms, is adequate but does recommend some key changes. Is the current 
structure adequate? I think so. Obviously it does need some adjustments to 
make it more efficient but quality improvement is something that DHBs, or 
any organisation should be always looking to improve. No organisation can 
obtain 100%. I think that the introduction of my proposed changes, of 
introducing the position of „Chief Governance Officer‟, changing the way 
board members are remunerated, having more performance-related 
remuneration and decreasing the size and diversity of boards are ways in 
which DHBs can become more efficient.  
 
This report concludes that some minor, but key changes are needed to the 
health structure that we have at present. More importantly, such changes 
should be developed independently of the government of the day. Health 
reforms should be free of political ideology and should instead be based on 
analytical approaches of current government literature.  
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Chapter Five - Recommendations 
5.1 Political Involvement  
One area which I see great potential for further research is to look at the 
political involvement or political interference which DHBs as organisations, 
and board members as individuals may experience.  
 
When it comes to corporate governance and DHBs should there be political 
interference? DHBs are government funded, but does the Minister of Health 
and MoH have too much power over DHBs and their communities? New 
Zealand is only a small country, but has great diversity in its population. Each 
DHB has a vast makeup, which is unique to their specific district, and 
perhaps more community involvement on the structure of the local health 
system is necessary? Or perhaps there is too little involvement by the 
government and MoH? 
 
5.2   Corporate Governance in the Public Sector 
What comes through in the literature is a general lack of academic research 
into corporate governance in the public sector, both internationally but 
especially in a New Zealand context.  
 
An important piece of research would be to review the corporate governance 
of the New Zealand public sector to see what efficiencies can be identified.  
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5.3    Board Remuneration in New Zealand  
A major theme in this research and especially in my discussion section is the 
notion of performance-related remuneration for board members. I have 
proposed a simple structure which could easily work in the health sector in 
New Zealand. However I do think that performance-related remuneration 
should be explored in more depth and with greater emphasis on boards being 
more strategic in their thinking, and being responsible for the consequences 
of their actions (both positive and negative). I think further research into both 
the public and private sectors would be worthwhile. I really feel that if boards 
are given incentives to put their best efforts in then boards will be able to 
function much better.  
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Reflective Journal 
I can honestly say that I have enjoyed researching and writing this report 
more than any other University programme that I have undertaken to date.  
 
I was rather nervous about conducting this report due to my limitations when 
it comes to grammar and expressing my thoughts into some form of written 
language. However, I feel that since completing this report I am much more 
confident in tackling these issues.  
 
One reason which made me feel a little at ease was the fact that I could 
choose my own area of research. District Health Boards or the public health 
system in general has interested me for a very long time. I have worked in 
DHBs since completing my Bachelor‟s degree in 2003, and hope now that 
now my Master‟s degree is completed I will get back into this field again 
(unless I continue on with my University education?).  
 
One of the key areas which I think is absolutely imperative to grasp when 
completing a research report of this nature is time management. It is so 
important that you manage and plan your time in an effective way as there is 
a lot of information to process within a short period of time.  
 
Another important aspect is to pick a topic which you are either interested in, 
or would like to become interested in. You do live and breathe the topic while 
you are conducting this report, so something that you are passionate about is 
very important.  
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The reason why I chose Corporate Governance is that I am extremely 
interested in learning about the inner workings of organisations, but 
especially the workings at the board level. I think that it is tremendously 
important that boards function efficiently as this does have a flow on effect in 
organisations, and if the boards are not effective then the organisation also 
suffers.  
 
I have learnt an array of new skills while conducting this research report. 
These are mainly: 
- The ability to think critically when reading a vast amount of literature; 
- The ability to formulate and expand on other people‟s ideas and concepts 
to evolve these into ideas and concepts which would fit into a New 
Zealand perspective;  
- The ability to take notes in a logical manner, so that when I review these 
notes some weeks later I can easily recall the knowledge that I had learnt.  
 
All of these skills are an essential skill for any manager to have. The ability to 
recall information, the ability to critically analysis information and to create 
your own thoughts and feelings on particular topics are also important for any 
manager.  
 
Managers need to be able to tackle multiple tasks at once, and I feel that this 
research report has helped me to build my skills in this regard.  
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Once again, I really enjoyed researching and writing this report, and I hope 
that you also find it interesting and informative.  
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